The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) wished to improve personnel training in a way that would prevent gas turbine failures on Navy ships and thereby save maintenance dollars. To determine what areas of training could provide the most benefit, NAVSEA and the Westinghouse Machinery Technology Division (MTD) systematically reviewed all gas turbine removals in the fleet during a three year period to establish which failures were most common and which might have been prevented by better operating or maintenance training. Several independent sources of maintenance data were correlated to develop one master list of training-related removals with all available information on each. Fleet Technical Support Center (FTSC) personnel, NAVSEA's waterfront technical representatives, were interviewed about specific failures and general maintenance problems they encounter in their daily work. By correlating all the data, a most probable root cause was assigned to each removal, and training improvements that could prevent similar failures were described for all applicable failures. The training improvements recommended could prevent approximately 36 percent . of unscheduled gas turbine engine removals. This percentage varies drastically with engine model.
INTRODUCTION
The US Navy Conventional Marine Propulsion Training Steering Committee, suspecting that many gas turbine engines were being removed from ships unnecessarily, tasked NAVSEA to determine areas in which operating and maintenance personnel training could be improved to decrease the rate of such removals. In conjunction with Westinghouse MTD, NAVSEA reviewed 3-1/4 years of data from the Marine Gas Turbine Major Assembly Removal Report, casualty reports (CASREP), depot disassembly and inspection reports (DIR), and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) technical representative reports on General Electric LM2500, Allison 501-KI7, Allied Signal TF4013, and Sundstrand T62T-40-7 engines. We also interviewed Fleet Technical Support Center, intermediate maintenance activity, and Assault Craft Unit (ACU) personnel on both coasts. These analyses and interviews are summarized in Westinghouse Electric Corporation (1993) . We established criteria for determining whether a failure was training-related and found that of 324 non-administrative removals, 116 were possible training-related removals. Some of the more significant training-related failures found are 501-KI7 burned turbines, TF4OB internal corrosion, and foreign and domestic object damage (FOD/DOD) caused by maintenance or operating errors on LM2500s, 501-K17s, and TF4OBs. Most training-related removals are caused by inadequate maintenance at the ship organizational level (0-level) or the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) organizational level 4 (0-level 4). We recommend maintenance training at this level in several areas. We also recommend improvements in training for operators and for ship intermediate-level (I-level) and LCAC organizational level 6 (0-level 6) maintenance personnel.
We wish to emphasize that the purpose of this study was to improve training and save money, not to assign blame. Searching for instances in which better training might have prevented a failure necessarily involves reviewing situations in which personnel did not do everything possible to prevent the failure. Shipboard troubleshooting and repair are difficult, and we recognize that some failures will defy all attempts to prevent or remedy them until the engine is removed, regardless of training.
METHODOLOGY

Approach
The approach to this task was to study data on gas turbine failures in the fleet and to develop recommendations to improve training based on the failure history. Rather than specifying the details of the training class revisions, we emphasized identifying technical areas where more or better training could prevent failures and save money. A follow-up effort would be required to evaluate current training in light of results from this task and to develop specific changes to training classes.
Because this task is based on failure data, it necessarily concentrates on shortfalls in training rather than on successes. We cannot obtain data from which to count how many potential failures were prevented by current good training, only how many actual failures could have been prevented by better training.
Failures Of Interest
To maximize the maintenance dollars that could be saved by improving training, we set out to identify gas turbine failures that met three criteria:
• They were expensive to repair. • They had a relatively high frequency of occurrence. • They could be prevented by proper training.
Cost to Repair. The most expensive kind of gas turbine repair is removing the engine and sending it to a depot. To confine ourselves to the most expensive failures, we limited our study to gas turbine removals. Because removals are handled differently in Navy maintenance documentation than are other failures, this had the further benefit of simplifying the search for relevant failures. Naval Surface Warfare Center -Carderock Division (NSWC-CD) in Philadelphia produces a monthly cumulative list of Naval gas turbine removals, called the removal history report. CASREPs are written for removals of LM2500s and 501-KI7s, so we could restrict our search to CASREP files and avoid plunging into the vast Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) database.
Removing an LM2500 or 50l-K17 is time-consuming and expensive. Except in the unusual case of extended intermediate (El) level maintenance, LM2500 gas generators, LM2500 power turbines, and 501-K17s are removed and sent to the depot. A replacement engine is installed in the ship. In all cases studied in this report, we have assumed that removed LM2500s and 501-K17s were returned to the depot.
TF408s and T62s, however, are removed from the LCAC, repaired at the ACU, and reinstalled. Because access to the installed engine is so restricted, in-place repair is seldom practical. Since the engines can be removed in a few hours, they are removed for most maintenance actions. A removal does not necessarily indicate a major failure or an unusually large expense. A return to the depot does.
The removal history report lists all TF4013 and T62 removals, regardless of whether the engine was returned to the depot. Because of tight LCAC mission requirements, parts shortages, and the on-site availability of an OEM technical representative, most failures have been repaired at the ACUs rather than at the depots. Rather than limiting the data to those engines that were returned to the depot, we considered all removals in the removal history report.
Freauency of Failure. We compared the various sources of removal data and developed one master list of removals with references to all the relevant documentation on each. Once we had assigned root causes to each failure, we counted the failures with similar causes.
Training-Related Failures.
Although the available documentation states the reason for removal, it rarely gives the true root cause of the failure. We used the various sources of information, discussions with fleet support personnel, and our engineering judgment to assign a root cause to each failure. We then determined whether training could have prevented the failure -not that poor training was the root cause of the failure, only that personnel with more knowledge could have prevented or mitigated the failure. (This is why we call these failures "training-related" rather than "training-caused.") These training-related failures represent opportunities in which training could have prevented failures and saved money, even if training was not "to blame" for the failure. A computer sorting of failure data provides a quick analysis of reported failure causes. Making subjective assessments of the root cause and the relation to training of each failure was tedious and time-consuming, but it enabled us to form a more accurate picture of what was actually happening in the fleet than a computer sorting could have.
Because we chose to concentrate on saving money by preventing gas turbine removals, we also considered cases in which the removal itself, rather than the failure, was the training-related issue. Repairing a failure with the engine in place, when practical, is much less expensive than removing the engine. If an engine was removed for a failure that could have been repaired in place, we considered the removal training-related, even if the root cause failure was unrelated to training.
Problems With Failure Counts
There are several reasons why any count of failures will contain inaccuracies. The more significant ones are the following:
• Similar failures can result either in removal or in local repair. The instances of similar failures that did not result in removals cannot be counted by any practical means. Fleet support personnel estimate that between 50 and 90 percent of similar failures are missed when only removals are counted.
• Engines that could be repaired may be sent to the depot for maintenance for reasons not related to the cause of the failure, such as a lack of parts, tools, time, or expertise on site. Maintenance documentation typically does not indicate why the decision was made to remove a particular engine. • CASREPs document the removal cause; removal history report entries document the ultimate engine discrepancies found. Even together, they sometimes fail to provide the true root cause of a failure, leading to possible miscounts of particular failures. We based the removal counts in this paper on assumptions about root causes made from all available information.
Nonetheless, these counts are sufficiently accurate to draw useful conclusions. Center -Carderock Division, 1992) that we judged to be related to training. "Total Removals" are the total numbers of removals from the removal history report excluding administrative removals for which no failure occurred. "Training-Related Removals as Percent of Total Engine Removals" is the percentage of the total removals for an engine caused by each type of training-related failure listed. "Approximate Total Engines in Fleet" gives approximate numbers of each type of engine in the active fleet at the time this study was conducted. "Training-Related Removals Normalized to LM2500 Population" shows how many removals there would have been if the failure rate had been the same but each engine's population had been equal to that of the LM2500. These numbers allow comparison of failure rate rather than number of failures.
SUMMARY OF REMOVALS
We can draw a few conclusions immediately: • TF4OB internal corrosion has been the most troublesome training-related failure. 
TRAINING ISSUES BY PERSONNEL FUNCTION
The issues covered in this section are drawn from discussions with numerous fleet support personnel and from general trends seen in the particular failures reviewed. Since different categories of personnel receive different training, we grouped issues by personnel fin-action so the information would be easier to use in developing improvements to training.
Operators
Operation-Induced Failure. None of the failures reviewed in this study were directly caused by operating errors. In fact, rarely does any operator action result in an immediate engine failure. Improper operation can, however, shorten an engine's life considerably. Frequent starts and stops of 501-K17s, for example, contribute to fuel nozzle clogging, combustor deterioration, and turbine burning. Operating TF4OBs in battle override allows the engine to operate at excessive temperature and power output, leading to more rapid wear of all engine components. Ships' forces should understand the consequences of such operation.
Recognizing Symptoms, Many failures could be easily corrected or prevented entirely if their symptoms were recognized early enough. Because of their day-to-day association with the engine, operators are in a position to recognize developing trends. Operators must initiate action as soon as they notice an undesirable trend instead of waiting until limits are exceeded.
Sometimes operators do not recognize a developing trend until the problem is severe. Small changes in parameters can be overlooked, even though the cumulative effect over time is large. Sometimes operators ignore warning signs as long as all parameters are within the allowed limits. An on-line condition monitoring system, such as the integrated condition assessment system (ICAS) would ensure that operators are made aware of developing trends and can take timely action.
Even without WAS, many important trends can be detected by the operators. Examples of developing problems that operators could recognize include the following:
• Slow starts of 501-KI7s indicate clogging fuel nozzles. If the nozzles are not cleaned, the engine may become impossible to start. Conversely, partially clogged nozzles produce distorted fuel spray patterns which result in burned combustor cans, turbine nozzles, and turbine blades. • High engine temperatures indicate that the engine should be washed. If washing does not remedy the problem, troubleshooting should begin.
• Open TF4013 blow-in doors indicate that the inlet filters are clogging. Most operators probably realize this but may not appreciate how quickly a TF4OB operating without filtration can be seriously damaged.
• Torque splits on LM2500s or TF4013s driving the same shaft should be investigated by maintenance personnel. One possible cause of LM2500 torque splits is a compressor inlet • temperature (CIT) sensor reading high, causing the engine to take too little of the load. The CIT problem cannot be detected by checking the CIT on the panel, because the instrument that provides the panel readout is not the same one that provides the signal to the main fuel control. If power is increased, the higher-torque engine may stall, causing significant blade damage.
Operators should understand the consequences of ignoring warning signs. Such training could especially help motivate operators on ships, where they also often perform maintenance. These operators should realize that ignoring a symptom early can cause more work for them later. Although LCAC operators do not perform maintenance on the craft, they should be taught to appreciate the importance of avoiding a failure during a mission.
The more operators know about engines and systems, the better they can recognize and evaluate unusual conditions. The shipboard I-level and LCAC 0-level 6 maintenance personnel interviewed felt that operators need to know more about systems and how systems interact Learning to follow procedures and press the right buttons at the right times is not enough. For ships' forces, education on engine-related systems would also help with 0-level troubleshooting training.
Shirt 0-Level And LCAC 0-Level 4 Maintenance
The lowest level of maintenance, 0-level maintenance, is performed by ships' forces, the same personnel who operate the gas turbines. The maintenance strategy for LCACs is fundamentally different from that for ships. The LCACs are maintained under the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) philosophy. Almost all low-level maintenance, even most of the straightforward preventive tasks, is performed by dedicated maintenance personnel rather than by craft operators. On LCACs, the lowest level of maintenance is called 0-level 4 and is performed by the ACU detachment personnel who travel with the craft on deployment These are not the same personnel who perform 0-level 6 maintenance in the ACU shop. The terms "0-level 4" and "0-level 6" are unique to LCAC maintenance. 0-level maintenance on ships and 0-level 4 maintenance on LCACs are roughly equivalent. This level of maintenance includes most preventive maintenance called out in the Preventive Maintenance System (PMS) and corrective maintenance that consists of repairing or replacing components.
Troubleshooting. I-level personnel report that ships' forces often have difficulty determining the root cause of a failure. Particular failures that have proved difficult for troubleshooters include the following:
• 501-K17 accessory gearbox or extension shaft failure. Five removals for this cause were found, as well as six requests for removals that were later denied. Accessory gearbox and extension shaft failures generally do not require engine removal.
• 501-K17 burned turbines. Some of these failures were probably caused by poor troubleshooting, because liquid fuel valves and closed-loop governors were misadjusted during attempts to troubleshoot slow starts. Recognizing that the closed-loop governor is the problem is a related troubleshooting issue. The governor controls are not changed when the engine is replaced. If the manual procedures are not followed correctly, the closed-loop governor can destroy the replacement as quickly as it did the first. This situation appears to have happened in one, and possibly two, of the cases reviewed. • LM2500 oil leaks. Some oil leaks require engine removal, but, depending on where the leak is located, many do not. Finding the source of the leak with the engine in place can be difficult Also, some engines routinely leak oil at low speed and power, especially FFG 7 class ships that do not have Gas Turbine Change 53 installed Easter egging. ACU shops report that many of the components removed and returned to them by detachment personnel have not failed. It is estimated that 50 percent of the parts returned were undamaged. Apparently, detachment personnel are simply replacing parts until they find the one that caused the problem -a practice known as "Easter-egging." Detachment personnel must be taught to identify the failed part more conclusively. They should also learn to check and adjust the TF4OB engine control box (ECU) early in the process. A misadjusted ECU is often the root cause of a problem, but several parts may be replaced before anyone realizes this. Easter egging is not.unique to the ACU.
Although training for both operating and maintenance personnel covers how the engines and supporting systems work, the material is not taught from a maintenance point of view. Personnel must understand how system interactions affect failures. Such knowledge greatly improves troubleshooting and helps personnel recognize symptoms during operation. No technical manual can cover all the troubleshooting possibilities of equipment as complex as a gas turbine engine and its support systems. For example, personnel must recognize that because the 501-KI7 bearings and generator share the same oil, an engine problem can be traced to a reduction gear failure.
Preventive Maintenance Personnel must understand the reasons for preventive maintenance tasks. Although all preventive maintenance tasks should be performed thoroughly and at prescribed intervals, in the real world a task will get more attention if one realizes the consequences of "gun-decking" it. Some tasks that are not fully given importance by maintenance personnel include:
• Exterior washing of LM2500s, which helps prevent variable stator vane (VSV) actuating arm corrosion. Severely corroded VSV actuating arms bind and can cause stalls and resultant blade failure. • Periodic inspection of LM2500 VSV actuating arms, which should detect VSV actuating arm corrosion before arm and resulting blade failure. • Cleaning 501-K17 fuel nozzles, which can prevent fuel deposits from growing too large. Fuel deposits can cause burned combustor cans or even burned high-pressure turbines.
• Maintaining TF4013 inlet filter seals, which can prevent corrosion and erosion of blades. • Washing TF4O8s regularly, and drying them well which can prevent internal corrosion.
Developing trends observed during maintenance inspections should be acted upon immediately instead of waiting until the equipment actually "fails" the inspection. The situation is similar to that of operators watching for symptoms. Early recognition of problems with LM2500 VSV actuating arms or TF408 inlet filters can prevent catastrophic engine failure. Partially burned 501-K17 combustor cans indicate clogging fuel nozzles. If the nozzles are not cleaned, the can will continue to burn until it is out of limits.
ACU Detachment Personnel ACU detachment personnel could receive considerable maintenance training by rotating through the ACU shop when the LCAC is in port, even though the shop performs 0-level 6 maintenance and the detachment personnel are responsible for 0-level 4 maintenance. Such training might improve their troubleshooting skills and prevent the Easter-egging discussed above. They would learn much about engine systems and about troubleshooting in general. Seeing firsthand the effects of poor preventive maintenance reinforces its importance. Learning about 0-level 6 maintenance would help detachment personnel understandwhy 0-level 6 repairs should not be attempted when deployed and would make them better qualified to do temporary repairs beyond 0-level 4 when necessary.
Foreign Obiect Damage Prevention Personnel must be made more cognizant of FOD prevention. The importance of tool control, lock wiring, POD screens, and checking the intake areas for objects (especially after maintenance) should be emphasized. There is no excuse for POD.
501-K17s and TF4OBs have the severest problems with POD. The last column of table 1 shows that these engines experience POD at a rate more than twice that of LM2500s. ACU personnel felt FOD prevention is less strongly emphasized in TF408 training than it is in LM2500 training. The TF408 FOD rate bears out this assertion.
No cases of FOD were reported for T62s; the configuration of the T62 intake makes POD almost impossible.
Ship I-Level And LCAC 0-Level 6 Maintenance
Surface ship Wevel maintenance is accomplished by Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA), either ashore or afloat. The equivalent LCAC maintenance is' called 0-level 6 maintenance and is accomplished by ACU shore-based detachments. Ship I-level maintenance requires controlled work packages and includes any work that enters the gas flow path or requires tooling too expensive to provide to the 0-level (but not so expensive that it's limited to the depot). This study was done before the formal introduction of LCAC 0-level 6 maintenance.
For LM2500s and 501-K17s, 1-level maintenance is always performed without removing the engine. The TF4OBs and T62s are removed from the craft for 0-level 6 maintenance but are repaired at the ACU rather than sent to the depot.
fjcisting Training, Maintenance at the ship I-level and LCAC 0-level 6 is learned almost entirely on the job. New personnel are taught by experienced personnel while working on actual engine repairs. The training received is determined by the kind of failure that happens to arrive in the shop and by the experience and knowledge of the teaching personnel.
IMAs have formal certification procedures on particular repair jobs. Personnel gain certification by performing tasks under qualified supervisors. Each IMA maintains its own certification files, and there is no formal way of tracking certification as an individual changes assignments in the Navy. A centralized certification tracking system is being developed. Much of the depot-level maintenance on TF4OBs is done by the OEM's technical representative at the ACU. The OEM technical representatives supervise the 0-level 6 TF408 maintenance. Their contract, however, will expire at the end of fiscal year 1997. Our original study revealed that ACU personnel needed more training to become self-sufficient. Since that study was completed, an on-the-job certification program similar to that used at IMAs has been developed and installed at the ACIJ5. Maintenance personnel can now become certified for particular jobs by participating in teams performing those jobs under the direction of another certified technician or a FTSC technical representative. We expect this program to produce the same excellent results it does at the IMAs. Since the program is so new, there is not yet enough data to evaluate whether it has affected training-related maintenance problems at the 0-level 6.
Troubleshooting Ship 1-level and LCAC 0-level 6 personnel are often called in to perform the complex troubleshooting that has baffled ships' forces or LCAC 0-level 4 personnel. They are also responsible for verifying the troubleshooting performed by the lower level if engine removal is recommendedengines are removed only with a recommendation from the I-level or 0-level 6, the concurrence of a FTSC technical representative, and the approval of NAVSEA.
In approximately 17 of the 116 training-related removals, the actual failure did not warrant engine removal, but the failure was apparently misdiagnosed and the engine was removed as a consequence. (It is possible that some of these engines were removed to meet ship schedules, but there is no way to determine this.) Five of these removals were because of LM2500 oil leaks and five were because of 501-K 17 accessory gearbox or extension shaft failures, both of which are discussed above in the section on 0-level maintenance. Troubleshooting complex problems on the ship is challenging at best. Indeed, some of these failures may be impossible to diagnose without removing the engine and are, at the very least, difficult to troubleshoot. Training that could help 1-level personnel identify them more reliably can save considerable costs. The Marine Gas Turbine Inspector (MGTI) program, which piloted at the Great Lakes Training Center in September 1995, helps fill this need.
We found no erroneous removals of TF4OBs or T62s. These engines are much easier to remove than LM2500s and 501417s and are commonly removed for more minor failures, so comparisons of LCAC 0-level 6 and ship I-level performance in troubleshooting are tenuous.
Engines for Training. Maintenance personnel should have the opportunity to train by working on engines dedicated to training. This may be the only way some personnel can become certified to repair a problem that occurs infrequently. Training engines could be located at Navy schools or at the IMAs and ACUs. Close controls would be necessary to ensure that training engine parts were not used as unofficial spares for fleet engines.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Particular Failures
The 501-1C17s experience training-related removals at roughly three times the rate of the LM2500s. Surface ship operator and 0-level maintenance training should emphasize the 501-K17 more strongly, instead of considering it the "other" engine besides the LM2500. Because T62s experience very few training-related failures, LCAC training dollars could be better spent on TF4OBs.
The 501417 burned turbines are, by far, the leading cause of training-related failures. Operator and 0-level maintenance training should emphasize preventing this failure, TF4OB internal corrosion has historically been a major problem. This failure could easily be brought under control by meticulous attention to existing water-wash and engine lay-up procedures. This is an individual command-related function.
FOD and DOD caused about 19 percent of the training-related removals, 7 percent of all non-administrative removals. POD and DOD are problems for all engines except the T62, and are more severe on 501-K17s and TF4OB5 than on LM2500s. Actual occurrences of error-induced POD and DOD are probably higher on LM2500s and 501-K17s than shown in table 1, because those that were repaired locally are not shown for those engines but are for TF4OBs. The engine with the severest POD problem is therefore probably the 501-K17, by an even greater margin than shown. All POD is preventable by training and appropriate command interest Further details of the individual failures and their causes is provided in Westinghouse Electric Corporation (1993).
Misdiagnosing the Failure
Misdiagnosing the failure caused about 17 of the 116 training-related removals found, or 15 percent. In these cases the actual failure did not warrant engine removal. The most common failures leading to erroneous removals were LM2500 oil leaks and 501-1(17 accessory gearbox or extension shaft failures, with five removals each. In addition, two cases of 501-1(17 burned turbines were caused by misdiagnosing the root cause of a previous problem with a closed-loop governor and consequently causing the replacement engine, also, to be burned. Such problems imply troubleshooting difficulties at both the 0-level and the I-level.
All the removals listed above were of LM2500s and 501-KI7s. Some TF4OB parts have been erroneously replaced by detachment personnel because they misdiagnosed the problem, but no TF4OB or T62 engine removals have occurred because of misdiagnosis.
Operation
Improper operation can shorten the life of an engine but rarely causes immediate failure. Operators should be taught to recognize developing problems so they can take action before the problem becomes severe. With more training in the systems they are operating, they can understand developing problems and their significance instead of trying to watch for combinations of parameters that mean nothing to them. • Prevention of FOD and DOD Maintenance training should cover how engine systems work and interact. It is nearly impossible to understand thoroughly and to apply the areas listed above without understanding the hardware itself.
ACU detachment personnel should rotate through the ACU shop when the LCAC is in port so they can learn about engine systems, troubleshooting, and the effects of poor 0-level 4 maintenance.
Shin 1-Level And LCAC 0-Level 6 Maintenance Poor l-level or 0-level 6 maintenance caused about 5 of the 116 training-related failures, or 4 percent. Although maintenance induced failures are not unknown, relatively few failures are caused by poor maintenance at this level because these activities do not become involved until after a failure occurs. Incorrect or incomplete troubleshooting led to about 17 more removals, bringing the total to about 19 percent of all training-related removals. Some of these failures, however, might not have been possible to troubleshoot on the ship Engines dedicated to training would help I-level and 0-level 6 maintenance personnel learn to perform maintenance tasks, especially those that are not common in the shop. Perhaps the engines would be useful for training lower-level maintenance personnel as well.
tessons Learned About Maintenance Data
In the process of studying these removals, we used available Navy maintenance data heavily and became familiar with their strengths and shortcomings. Although our purpose was to draw conclusions about training, we also made some observations on the available maintenance data themselves that are worth presenting here.
1ntegratina Various Reoorts No cross-referencing was provided between the various reports that describe a particular failure, such as the removal history report, the CASREP, the depot DIR, and the 3-M database. NSWC-CD was unaware of any attempt to correlate the removal history report with other maintenance reports. We had to compare engine positions, ships, dates, and failure descriptions to determine which reports covered the same event.
This integration, however, was crucial to the success of the task. Different maintenance personnel document different aspects of a failure, and pooling the information from these different reports improves insight considerably. The CASREP, for example, might have the best description of what symptoms ship •personnel saw, but the DIR provides the details of the condition found inside the engine, which ship's force could never have seen.
No individual is in a position to write the ultimate maintenance report. Instead, each failure should have an identification assigned to it that follows it throughout the maintenance process, so all agencies would use the same reference number. Even better would be for all the agencies to add their reports to one common database, so all the reports could be accessed together by future investigators.
A further benefit of a common failure identification would be the ability to use all the data available. We did not use the 3-M reports on the failures we studied, Comparing failures individually to find the report associated with a particular failure is hopelessly time-consuming in the huge 3-M database. Common reference numbers would have enabled us to access only the 3-M reports of interest.
The rhos thorough solution would be a consolidated reporting system for all activities. Al] maintenance reports, excluding 3-M, could be stored in the same database, allowing easy retrieval of all data associated with a given failure.
Determining Root Causes None of the reports consistently provided accurate root causes for failures; many provided no root cause at all but simply stated that a particular part had failed. Frequently no one individual knew the root cause. If shipboard troubleshooting is unsuccessful, ship's force may well be unaware of the root cause. The depot, on the other hand, can tell what happened to the engine but doesn't know how the engine was operated or maintained on the ship. IMA, ACU, and FTSC personnel are in the middle and could have either or both these problems. Only by combining the different reports, as discussed above, can the root cause be found.
The natural desire to avoid self-incrimination, whether intentionally or subconsciously, can alter reporting accuracy of root causes. Ship's force might hesitate to state that a failure was caused by not keeping up with PMS, for example, whereas an OEM technical representative might prefer to blame an engine failure on the crew than on a design flaw. We do not know how often reported root causes were slanted in this way and made no effort to find out, since it was immaterial to our objective of improving training.
Extracting root causes from the sometimes sketchy information available requires considerable expertise in maintenance. Our discussions with fleet support personnel were invaluable for determining root causes because of their experience with similar failures. Some of the root causes are, nonetheless, simply the best estimates based on the information available.
For these reasons, computer sorting 'of failures using the causes from the maintenance reports will be very inaccurate; root causes must be evaluated by hand.
Undocumented Failures, Fleet support personnel admit that the paperwork associated with a repair is not always filled out, especially if the IMA or ACU is busy and the repair is straightforward. Removals of LM2500s and 501-K17s, however, are always documented. If all agencies used one integrated database it is more likely that many of these failures would be captured instead of being lost in the IMA's or ACU's internal records. An integrated database was developed, but after completion of Phase I, the funding was cut and the effort dropped.
Similar failures sometimes result in removal and sometimes do not. Some may not result in a CASREP at all, as noted in the Methodology section. We could not, consequently, ascertain how many similar failures might have been caused by training deficiencies but did not result in removals. Many of these failures are doubtless stored in the 3-M database, but the categories assigned to failures by ships' forces are sufficiently inaccurate to make it difficult to search for similar failures.
gffectiveness of Data Despite the shortcomings discussed above, we believe the Navy maintenance data are thorough and accurate enough to be extremely useful in studies such as this one. Some failures might have been overlooked, and some might be categorized incorrectly, but each represents an actual event, a fact that can be used to justify conclusions. It is known, for example, that at least five LM2500 removals were caused by actuating arm failures during the period studied, so we can say with confidence that training that could prevent actuating arm failures would save a significant amount of money. While not perfect, this is far better than relying on anecdotal evidence or guesswork to decide where training money should be spent.
Navy maintenance data are a valuable resource that should be consulted for any proposed change that affects maintenance, whether to training, procedures, or equipment Changes are always more likely to be effective if they respond to what is actually happening in the fleet.
